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DONALD N. ZILLMAN*

Prisoners in the Bangladesh War:
Humanitarian Concerns and
Political Demands*
I. Introduction
The early months of 1973 saw the end of American involvement in the
Vietnam War and the release of approximately 600 American prisoners of
war. Particularly since the start of the Nixon administration, the alleged
mistreatment of U.S. prisoners and the conditions of their return had
become major political and emotional issues. The United States deplored
Communist failure to abide by Geneva Convention standards and encouraged other nations and private citizens to put pressure on the Communists
to insure prisoner protection.
At the same time that American diplomatic efforts were being expended
on behalf of 600 prisoners of war, an estimated 90,000 Pakistani civilians
and soldiers were taken prisoner in the brief war with India and Bangladesh in December 1971. These prisoners were held for over 20 months
amidst general unconcern in the United States and around the world. While
their release is welcome, the fact of their detention coupled with the
Vietnam POW experience, gives cause for concern in the international
legal community.
This article will examine the treatment of Pakistani prisoners of war
under international law. The December 1971 conflict and its aftermath will
be examined to shed light on the legal and political claims of the three
parties to the dispute: India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Also revelant is the
role of other nations and private groups in advancing humanitarian treatment of one group of victims of war, captured military personnel.

*Captain, U.S. Army; Instructor, Civil Law Division, The Judge Advocate General's
School, Charlottesville, Va.; J.D., Univ. of Wisconsin; LL.M., Univ. of Virginia; Asst. Prof.
of Law (Designate), Arizona State Univ. College of Law.
tSee also the case of Pakisteen v. India, I.C.J., 7 INT'L LAw. 727 (July 1973) and 919
(Oct. 1973), and in Case Comments, infra.-Editor
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II. The Background of the Prisoner Problem
In retrospect, neither the fact nor the outcome of the December 1971
war on the subcontinent was a great surprise. Pakistan itself had always
been an improbable union of differing geographic territories and ethnic
stocks.1 The West Pakistani domination since independence had left East
Pakistan as a virtual colony. Continuing conflict with India left the West
Pakistanis facing two opponents on the subcontinent.
Events came to a head with the calling of free elections in 1970. The
numerically superior East Pakistanis voted overwhelmingly for the Awami
Party of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and gained legislative control of the
country. Faced with this unexpected loss of control, President Yahya
Khan refused to yield power. The legislature never met. Sheikh Mujib in
March 1971 issued a call for East Pakistani (hereafter Bangladesh) independence.
The West Pakistani Army responded with savage attacks on the population of Bangladesh. While estimates vary, it is undisputed that from
March to December of 1971, Pakistani troops slaughtered civilians by the
tens of thousands and drove hundreds of thousands of refugees across the
Indian border. 2 World reaction to one of the major human rights affronts of
the century was virtually non-existent.
By December, the stream of refugees, the massacres of fellow Bengalis,
and old military scores with Pakistan prompted an eager Indian military
response to a Pakistani attack in the west. In two weeks, India had
humbled its old adversary on the Eastern front and the independence of
Bangladesh was a reality. The Pakistani forces in the east surrendered on
December 16. Consistent with earlier statements of adherence to the
Geneva Prisoner of War Convention, Indian General Manekshaw promised: "personnel who surrender shall be treated with the dignity and respect to which soldiers are entitled, and I will abide by the provisions of
the Geneva Conventions."' 3 The Surrender Document itself reflected this
statement and the fact that prisoners would be repatriated upon the signing
4
of a peace treaty.
Early reports indicated that prompt repatriations would occur. 5 Bangladesh and Indian officials counted between 80,000 and 90,000 Pakistani
1
For background material on the December 1971 War, see Nanda, A Critique of United
Nations
Inaction in the Bangladesh Crisis, 49 DENVER L.J.53-56 (1972).
2
Sheik Mujib estimated 3 million deaths, New York Times (hereafter NYT), January 24,
1972, p. 1 col. 5. Pakistan President Bhutto has estimated no more than 60,000 deaths, NYT,
March 26, 1972, p. 7 col. 1.
3
NYT, December 16, 1971, p. 16 col. 6.
4
NYT, December 17, 1971, p.1 col. 5.
INYT, December 26, 1971, p.12 col. 3.
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prisoners.6 In addition a large number of Pakistani civilians were prevented
from leaving Bangladesh. Pakistan reported about 600 Indian prisoners 7
and a substantial Bengali population stranded in the west. By the end of
December, however, it was becoming increasingly evident that a prompt
and complete exchange of prisoners was unlikely. Primarily at issue was
the trial of Pakistani soldiers for war crimes committed during the reign of
terror from March to December.8
The fledgling Bangladesh government pressed strongly on the point as
publicized accounts of the atrocities began to suggest their massive scope. 9
After several days of vacillation, India sided with Bangladesh, recognizing
that war crimes trials were proper and implying that repatriation would
await the resolution of the war crimes issue. 10 As the debate continued,
India began relocating all prisoners in internment camps in India."
The freeing of Sheikh Mujib by Pakistan 12 and his return to Bangladesh
did not spur rapid agreement on the prisoners and other issues. While
token releases of sick and wounded 3 and the eventual freeing of all 600
Indian prisoners did occur, the great majority of Pakistani prisoners remained in Indian camps. In the early months of captivity, treatment was
reported in conformity with humanitarian rules, and Pakistani popular
indignation remained submerged. However, as the months accumulated to
more than a year, reports of ill treatment grew. So did the significance of
the issue in Pakistani politics.
Sheikh Mujib soon made clear his willingness to press for war crimes
trials. He cited three million deaths and in March 1972 spoke of 1,500
Pakistanis against whom charges were contemplated. 14 Included were the
two generals in charge of eastern operations. An Indian- Bangladesh 25year mutual aid pact signed the same month agreed to "fully cooperate" in
trying those "responsible for the worst genocide in recent times."' 5 A
separate provision conditioned prisoner release on Pakistani recognition of
the new state of Bangladesh.
By midsummer, when President Bhutto and Indira Gandhi met at Simla
for peace talks, the issues were somewhat better defined.' 6 Pakistan was
increasingly viewing return of its prisoners as the significant issue. Bargain6

NYT, December 29, 1971, p. 7 col. 1; NYT, January 1I,1972, p. 11 col. 6.
NYT, January 11, 1972, p. IIcol. 6.
8
NYT, December 27, 1971, p. 1 col. 6.
9
See generally, id.; NYT, December 28, 1971, p. 3 col. 1.
'ONYT, December 28, 1971, p. 3 col. 1.
'INYT,
December 29, 1971, p. 7 col. 1.
12
NYT, January 9, 1972, p.1 col. 8; NYT, January 10, 1972, p. 10 col. 1.
13
See e.g., NYT, February 26, 1972, p. 7 col. 1.
' 4 NYT, January 24, 1972, p. 1 col. 5; February 21, p. 4 col. 8; March 19, p. 1 col. 7.
15
NYT, March 19, 1972, p. Icol. 7.
' 0NYT, May 6, 1972, p. 2 col. 4; June 29, p. 3 col. 4.
7
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ing chips were its control over Bengalis detained in West Pakistan and
desirous of leaving for Bangladesh, its power of recognition of Bangladesh,
and its ability to settle long standing differences with India. India viewed a
settlement of the Kashmir dispute subcontinent arms race as its fundamental objective. Its major bargaining points were its recently demonstrated
military might and control of the prisoners.
Bangladesh continued to stress war crimes trials, and recognition by
Pakistan as its major objectives. Implicit in the recognition concern was
uneasiness over possible Pakistani efforts to resubjugate the new nation.
Partial control over the prisoners, India's support, and a generally sympathetic world community were the new state's strongest assets.
The Pakistan- India summit made encouraging progress in improving
relations between the two old antagonists. Troop withdrawals and a gradual normalization of relations were called for. 17 The prisoner issue remained
unresolved in large part because of its linkage with the war crimes and
recognition issues. This impasse continued for over a year despite increasing public attention.
Differences were finally resolved in late August, 1973. Hard diplomatic
bargaining between Pakistan and India, rather than humanitarian concern,
paved the way to a settlement. A December, 1972 agreement resolved
many of the Kashmir issues. An April, 1973 proposal by India and Bangladesh for coordinated prisoner return led to July, 1973 talks in Rawalpindi.
One month later an eleven-day negotiating session was capped by a
prisoner agreement. 18 India agreed to release the prisoners. Bangladesh,
through the Indian negotiators, agreed to abandon plans for war crimes
trials. Bengalis stranded in Pakistan and a number of civilians stranded in
Bangladesh were authorized to go to their coutry of choice. Recognition of
Bangladesh by Pakistan appeared to be forthcoming.
III. The Legal Standards
Few areas of the international law of human rights are as well defined as
that concerning treatment of prisoners of war. The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 19 expanded the
coverage of prior Conventions of 192920 and 1907.21 Its ratification by the
17NYT, July 3, 1972, p. I col. 8.
18Washington Post, August 29, 1973, p. 1 col. 8.
19The Prisoner of War Convention appears at T.I.A.S. 3364 (12 August 1949). (hereafter
cited as G PW).
20
Convention concluded at Geneva on July 27, 1929, relative to the treatment of prisoners of2 war.
'Hague Convention No. IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36
Stat. 2277, T.S. 539 (18 October 1907).
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great majority of the nations of the world probably makes its major principles part of customary international law. Humanitarian prisoner treatment was recognized as part of customary law during the post-World War
22
II war crimes trials.
There can be no doubt that the Geneva Convention applied in the
December 1971 war. In several respects, its applicability was much clearer
than in Vietnam. Both India and Pakistan were Convention signatories of
long standing. 23 India, Pakistan and Bangladesh all assured the International Committee of the Red Cross in December 1971 that they were
bound by the Convention. 24 Lastly, the December 16th surrender agreement specifically provided for Geneva Convention applicability. 25 Unlike
Vietnam with its gradations of guerilla fighters, it is undisputed that all
captured Pakistani soldiers were entitled to treatment under the Convention. 26 Further, India, unlike North Vietnam, has not taken reservation
to Convention Article 85. This article provides continuing Convention
treatment to persons convicted of pre-capture offenses, most notably war
crimes.
The 143 articles of the Convention broadly assert a goal of humanitarian
treatment within the framework of military control. Captured prisoners are
the responsibility of the state capturing them and not of individual soldiers.2 7 While in captivity, prisoners are to be provided with adequate food,
shelter, clothing, 28 medical care, 29 communication with the outside world,30
and religious and cultural opportunities.3 ' Coercive interrogation is impermissible3 2 as are harsh labor conditions. 33 Discipline is accorded to the
military law of the captor nations. 3 4 But lengthy sections on disciplinary
3 5
and judicial punishments require many elements of due process.
Several sections mandate or encourage the return of prisoners prior to
the end of active hostilities. Section 118 calls for complete repatriation
22

See e.g., III, Law Reports of Trials of the War Criminals (Anton Schosser, et al.
1945), 17-19, 96; see the subsequent codification of the Nuremberg Principles adopted by
UNGA Res., 5 UNGAOR, Supp. 12, UN Doc. A/1316 (1950).
23india
ratified the Convention, 9 November 1950; Pakistan, 12 June 195 1.
24
NYT, December 14, 1971, p. 17 col. 2.
"NYT, December 16, 1971, p. 16 col. 6.
26
GPW, Arts. 2 and 4.
27GPW, Art. 12.
28
GPW, Arts. 25-28.
29
GPW, Arts. 29-32.
30
GPW, Arts. 69-77.
31
GPW, Arts. 34-38.
32
GPW, Art. 17.
3
' GPW, Arts. 49-57.
34
GPW, Art. 82.
35GPW, Arts. 99- 108.
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"after the cessation of active hostilities." In order to insure obedience to
the Convention, several neutral inspection approaches are recognized.
Most prominent is the protecting-power concept, relying on a neutral
nation to protect the interests of a belligerent's war prisoners. 36 More often
37
used are the services of the International Committee of the Red Cross,
long the special protector of the Geneva Prisoner Convention. In addition,
the role of other humanitarian organizations is specifically recognized.
IV. The Claims of the Parties
A. Pakistan
The fundamental Pakistani claims was for the immediate release of all
prisoners. 38 Secondary or compromise claims involved the humane treatment of its prisoners and the release of all prisoners of war save those
actually charged with war crimes.
As noted, GPW Article 118 calls for prisoners to be "released and
repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities." Pakistan
contended that the December 16, 1971 surrender marked the end of
"active hostilities." They cited the surrender terms, adoption of the Geneva Convention, with the specific understanding that prompt repatriation
would follow surrender. 39 The major alternative discussed by the truce
negotiators was a cease fire with Pakistan allowed the opportunity to
withdraw its troops. 40 This was rejected by the Indians.
By its language, Article 118 makes clear that a formal peace treaty or
settlement of all differences between combatants is not a precondition to
prisoner release. The earlier language of the Hague Regulations of 1907
that called for repatriation "after the conclusion of peace" illustrates the
intent of separating military from diplomatic considerations. 41 In situations
of guerilla war or long-term low-level conflict, it may be as difficult to
specify an end to "active hostilities" as it would be to point to a "conclusion of peace."
Yet the Pakistani situation appeared a rather clear case. The war
reached a definite military conclusion, a formal surrender was signed,
fighting stopped, and the losing party changed governments. In addition,
36

GPW, Art. 8.

37

GPW, Art. 125.

38

President Bhutto has told UN Secretary General Waldheim that the return of the
prisoners is the "fundamental and most important" issue on the subcontinent. NYT, February
8, 1973, p. 3 col. 3.
39
NYT, December 16, 1971, p. 16 col. 6; December 28, 1971, p. 3 col. 1.
40
NYT, December 16, p. 1 col. 8.
41
Hague Convention IV, Annex Article 20.
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the Pakistanis freed not only the handful of Indian prisoners, but the
imprisoned leader of Bangladesh. Certainly by any fair definition, "active
hostilities," meaning the December declared war, and the previous months
guerilla incursions, had concluded by mid-December 1971.
The Pakistani position toward the war crimes issue was somewhat
uncertain although gradually shifting to apparent opposition to any trials.
Even Pakistani officials conceded that significant and unnecessary killings
42
of civilians occurred and that some war crimes trials might be proper.
However, Pakistan clearly prefered to try its soldiers. While Pakistan did
not push the issue, it probably would have been receptive to an early return
of all but the 1,000 (later 195) suspected war criminals. Possibly, Article
109's provision for direct repatriation "of able-bodied prisoners of war who
have undergone a long period of captivity" could have provided the legal
peg on which to hang a pre-1973 release agreement without inflaming the
war crimes issue. Pakistan might also have agreed to lift any emigration
restriction on Bengalis detained in their country.
Unlike the Vietnam War, only limited concern was raised over prisoner
treatment. At least one Western report was positively laudatory of Indian
compliance with the Geneva Convention. 43 Other evidence indicated increasing complaints of inadequate living conditions, medical treatment and
protection against brutality. 44 Overall grave breaches of the Geneva Convention appear to have been rare. Doubtless it will be some time before the
full story of treatment in the camps is known.
B. India -Bangladesh
A variety of claims were asserted by the victors in the December war to
justify their continued retention of the 90,000 Pakistanis. While certain
issues were unique to one party, India's continued willingness to tie its
claims to those of Bangladesh 45 makes it appropriate to consider both
nation's claims together.
1. THE RIGHT TO RETAIN PRISONERS UNTIL PEACE IS ASSURED
In different contexts, both India and Bangladesh spoke of an insistence
on a firm peace prior to prisoner return. Mr. Karim, Bangladesh Permanent
4

*NYT, March 26, 1972, p. 7 col. I.
43See e.g., Washington Post, February 10, 1973, p. 15 col. I (Columnist Tom Braden
account of a prisoner-of-war camp visit).
44Washington Post, March 5, 1973, p. 23 col. 2 (letter from M.I. Butt, Pakistan Embassy
Information Minister citing ICRC reports of overcrowding, poor hygiene, spreading disease
and abuse of prisoners); NYT, February 6, 1973, p. 3 col. 4.
4NYT, February 7, 1973, p. 14 col. 4. Mrs. Gandhi reportedly told Secretary General
Waldheim that any solution satisfactory to Bangladesh would be satisfactory to India.
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Observer to the United Nations, noted in February 1973 that Pakistan
talked of eventual reconquest. He cited a draft Pakistani Constitution that
spoke of reclaiming "East Pakistan." '46 Indian sources expressed concern
over new weapons shipments to Pakistan from China, and referred to the
47
prisoners as "four-and-a-half divisions of trained troops."
In terms of the Geneva Convention, the Indian and Bangladesh portion
was that no "cessation of active hostilities" 48 occurred until August 1973.
In essence, this approach makes meaningless the repatriation provisions of
the Convention. Threats of war have existed throughout the
post-independence history of the subcontinent. Similar situations exist in
the Middle East and in Indochina. Yet despite continuing political
differences and the possibility of future military action, prisoners of war
were returned after the stated end of hostilities. Any other approach might
subject prisoners to a lifetime captivity. As a matter of international law,
49
the India-Bangladesh position must be rejected.
2. THE RIGHT TO RETAIN PRISONERS FOR
TRIAL AS WAR CRIMINALS
This issue was initially raised by Bangladesh shortly after the conclusion
of the December war, and pressed by them until August 1973. India
consistently expressed a willingness to support their ally on the matter.
Both countries asserted a right to hold all prisoners until a satisfactory
solution to the problem of war crimes trials was reached. No legal argument was advanced to support this position. Rather, a mixed legal and
political justification diverted focus from the real issues.
It is undisputed that in the wake of the post-World War 11 war crimes
trials, and codification of the Nuremberg principals, 50 a right to try individuals for war crimes and crimes against humanity exists. These precedents also authorized Bangladesh, the wronged state, to exercise jurisdiction over the war criminals. The Geneva Convention authorizes trials
under the military law of the captor power. 51 Article 85 need not have
blocked any fundamental objective of Bangladesh.
The Article provides: "Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of
the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even
46

NYT, February 16, 1973, p. 34 col. 3.
Post, January 18, 1973, p. 22 col. 8.
8GPW, Art. 118.
49
Professor Levie reached a similar conclusion in his pre-settlement review of the impasse. Levie, Legal Aspects of the Continued Detention of Pakistani Prisoners of War by
India, 67 AM. J.INT'L L.512 (1973).
50
5 1See, note 2 1, supra.
GPW, Art. 82.
47
Washington
4
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if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention." Opponents of this
provision at the 1949 drafting sessions regarded it as impermissible to
extend humanitarian protections to an individual whose acts had shown his
unwillingness to be bound by humanitarian principles. 52 Reservations were
taken by the Communist bloc nations on this account. Article 85, however,
only assures continued Convention application.
The judicial sanctions provision of the Convention make clear that
offenders against international law may be confined in jail facilities, 53 or
executed upon proper conviction by a military court. 54 Bangladesh would
have been constrained only to the extent of providing a fair trial, 55 providing notice to the Pakistani government, 56 and delaying any death sentences
for six months. 57 This would have added Bangladesh desires for a full
airing of atrocities. The repatriations section of the Convention also allows
further detention of prisoners "against whom criminal proceedings for an
indictable offense are pending," 58 Their detention may be continued
through trial and completion of their sentence.
The frequent Bangladesh expression of its legal right to have war crimes
trials was therefore quite correct. It was also quite irrelevant as far as the
vast majority of Pakistani prisoners were concerned. At most, Bangladesh
stated about 1,500 prisoners were possible suspects. 59 The number was
since reduced to about 200. Surely after several months time it was no
great problem to divide the 90,000 prisoners into three groups-those
against whom clear evidence of war crimes existed, a diminishing group of
suspects against whom further information was needed, and the vast majority against whom there exists no evidence of violations. The latter group at
a minimum should have been repatriated immediately under international
law.
3. THE RIGHT TO CONDITION PRISONER RETURN ON
DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION
Bangladesh also took the position that it would neither begin war crimes
trials nor return the prisoners until Pakistan formally recognized its status
as a nation. Recognition by Pakistan does make more difficult any subsequent Pakistani effort at reconquest in addition to boosting Bangladesh
52

See, II Trial Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, 319.et seq.

53GPW,Art. 108.
54

GPW, Arts. 100 and 101.
GPW, Arts. 99- 108.
GPW, Arts. 104 and 107.
57GPW,Art. 101.
58
GPW, Art. 119.
59
NYT. March 19, 1972, p. I col. 7; March 30, 1972, p. 3 col. 1.
55
56

International Lawyer, Vol. 8, No. I

Prisoners in Bangladesh War

national prestige. The question remains whether this justified a refusal to
release the prisoners for almost two years.
As on other issues, a possible Bangladesh argument of not being bound
by the Convention fails upon examination of the record. During the war,
representatives of Bangladesh stated their adherence to the Convention
precepts. 60 After the war, Bangladesh became a formal Convention signatory. Nothing in the Convention requires diplomatic relations between
belligerents as a precondition to Convention application. To the contrary,
Articles 2 and 3 seek to give a broad scope to the types of armed conflicts
entitled to Geneva Convention protections. Again, political convenience
cannot repeal the clear language of Article 118.
4. THE INDIAN POSTURE

India's position during much of the controversy was to maintain that it
was a joint captor with Bangladesh and bound in part by her wishes.6 1 To
some extent, this was a convenient ploy for advancing Indian interests in
the name of friendship for Bangladesh. On the other hand, the expense of
keeping 90,000 prisoners and the growing international and internal 62 embarassment indicated that Indian and Bangladesh interests diversed as the
impasse lengthened.
Convention Article 12 discusses the transfer of prisoners between detaining powers. Transfers may only be made to another Convention party
which has shown its willingness to comply with the Convention provisions.
Once transfer is effected "responsibility for the application of the Convention rests upon the Power accepting [the prisoners]." Further, the party
transferring the prisoners has a duty to correct any Convention violators
called to its attention or reclaim the prisoners.
The application of Article 12 to the Indian situation is not totally clear.
Most of the prisoners probably were at all times under control of the
Indian Army from surrender to arrival at the Indian detention camp. Thus,
talk of transfer is irrelevant. The lesser number of prisoner held by forces
of Bangladesh at one time probably benefitted by transfer to Indian authority.
However, in both situations, India had the responsibility for Convention
compliance including repatriation and humane treatment. Theories of joint
60
NYT,
61

December 14, 1971, p. 17 col. 2.
Washington Post, January 18, 1973, p. 22 col. 5.
62
E.g., the comment of Times of India correspondent Ajit Bhattacharjea: "The benefits
likely to be secured by forcing Pakistan to recognize Bangladesh, say this year instead of next,
are hardly big enough to justify detaining 90,000 men for so long." NYT, February 6, 1973,
p. 3 col. 4.
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responsibility were essentially rejected by the Convention drafters. 63 In
any event, joint responsibility would simply require both India and Bangladesh to meet humanitarian standards. To excuse violations by Bangladesh
because of their non-control of the prisoners, and Indian violations because
of compliance with the co-captor's illegal wishes, would obviate the great
purpose of the Geneva Convention.
V. Some Conclusions and Suggestions
Depending on one's perspective, the Geneva Convention either worked
very well or very poorly in the Bangladesh conflict. The mere fact that
90,000 troops of a despised enemy were treated in generally humane
fashion and eventually returned to their homeland is a tribute to the
Prisoner of War Convention. On the other hand, the refusal for almost two
years to repatriate the Pakistanis has struck a serious blow to an essential
element of humane prisoner of war policies. Despite appealing political
arguments, both India and Bangladesh were without legal justification for
their policies. Further, their actions, in the wake of widespread concern
over violations of the laws of war in Indochina, call into question the
continuing validity of the Geneva Conventions.
The failure of the United States to take a stronger stand on the subcontinent prisoner question was most disappointing. Article I of the Geneva
Prisoner Convention commits all Convention parties (of which the United
States is one) "to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention
in all circumstances." Article 129 makes clear each signatory's responsibility to encourage prosecution of Convention violators. Compared with
the inactivity of other Convention signatories, the United States record is
less blameworthy. However, the world position of the United States
coupled with its recent prisoner experiences in Vietnam would seem to
demand a greater degree of concern.
The American involvement in the subcontinent war with its clear tilt
toward Pakistan might have made suspect any initiative on the prisoner of
war question. Certainly, though, more neutral nations and international
organizations might have been encouraged to stress Geneva Convention
violations. Alternatively, the United States might have demonstrated its
humanitarian bona fides by supporting the Bangladesh position regarding
the legitimacy of war crimes trials.
The following American approach would have mixed sound politics with
the promotion of human rights. President Nixon might have simultaneously
proposed to the leaders of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, the following:
63

See, Final Record, supra, note 50 at 437 et seq., 563; 1l1 Final Record 272.
International Lawyer, Vol. 8, No. I

Prisonersin Bangladesh War

The United States recognizes that serious human rights deprivations have
taken place on the subcontinent. Killings in Bangladesh, continued confinement of Pakistani prisoners, and limitations on the emigration of minority group members from Pakistan and Bangladesh disturb all persons.
However, to deny human rights in one area because of denials in other
areas is to jeopardize the objective of all humanitarian treatment.
Therefore, the United States suggests the following actions: (1) Immediately upon agreement, India and Bangladesh will release a percentage of
all prisoners of war held, with attention being given to first release of the
sick and the inmates of badly overcrowded camps. (2) The United States,
together with other nations, shall, within six weeks, offer a list of distinguished and impartial judicial figures to serve as judges of trials of the
64
major war criminals designated by Bangladesh.
Bangladesh, India and Pakistan shall each have a limited number of
peremptory challenges to the judicial selections. (3) Within the same six
week period, Bangladesh shall supply a final list of prisoners to be subject
to trial. (4) At United States' expense, the panel of distinguished jurists
shall be assembled in Bangladesh to hear evidence and render judgment on
the major accused. Minor war criminals, generally those not in a position of
command or accused of isolated violations of the laws of war, may be tried
by the courts of Bangladesh. Provisions of the Geneva Convention for fair
trials shall be observed in all cases.
(5) Upon submission of the International tribunal and the list of accused, all other prisoners shall be promptly repatriated. At the same time,
Pakistan and Bangladesh will allow emigration of any minority group
members in their country.
Whether as proponent or merely supporter of such an initiative, the
United States would have contributed to the international human rights
movement. Ideally, the two humanitarian objectives of prompt prisoner
release and the trial of war criminals should have proceeded separately
after December, 1971. Political reality, however, almost inevitably forced a
linkage of the two issues. The proposed American initiative would have
accepted this fact. But in return it would have advanced international
standards in both the prisoner repatriation and war crimes areas. The
August, 1973 settlement advanced neither. One can only hope that such
disappointments will not discourage future international cooperation in the
human rights field.
64

Bangladesh sources in March 1972 were reportedly agreeable to the participation of
foreign jurists in the war crimes trials. NYT, March 30, 1972, p. 3 col. 1. Certainly, this
would add legitimacy to the trials and prove a healthy precedent for further enforcement
violations of the laws of war.
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